Using a large sample of exogenous events that negatively affected Korean banks during the 1997-1998 period, we examine the value of durable bank relationships in Korea. We show that adverse shocks to banks have a negative effect not only on the value of the banks themselves, but also on the value of their client firms, and that this adverse effect on firm value is a decreasing function of the financial health of both banks and client firms. Our results are concentrated in the second half of the sample period when Korean banks experienced severe difficulties.
Introduction
In the banking literature, "relationship banking" is portrayed as being valuable to both banks and their client firms (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Fama, 1985; Sharpe, 1990; Diamond, 1991) . A bank provides the firm with loans and diverse financial services on the basis of a continuing relationship. It acquires information continuously about the firm and can thus intervene quickly and informally. Since the continuity of relationships allows the bank to have a competitive advantage in collecting information and monitoring the borrowing firm, it reduces informational asymmetries and the costs of financial distress for the client firm.
The advantages of relationship banking are known to be much greater in bank-centered financial systems, such as those in Germany and Japan, than in the capital-market-centered systems of AngloSaxon countries (Aoki, 1990; Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991; Kaplan, 1994; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995) . In a bank-centered financial system, firms obtain most of their external financing from their main banks, although they maintain banking relationships with several banks. The main bank is particularly knowledgeable about the firm's prospects. The main bank sometimes acts like a management consultant, providing advice to management and sending directors to the firm's board in periods of financial distress to help the firm improve its performance.
However, relationship banking has a cost. As Rajan (1992) argues, because bank financing makes the bank well informed about the firm, it tends to make the firm hostage to the bank and hence enables the bank to extract rents. Further, an unexpected deterioration in bank durability imposes costs on client firms (Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek, 1993; Gibson, 1995; Kang and Stulz, 2000) . When a bank does poorly and suffers from a decreased ability to lend to a borrower, the client firm is adversely affected, since the firm loses the benefits of the durable bank relationship for the future. For example, Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) examine the effect on client firm value of the near-failure of the Continental Illinois Bank and its subsequent rescue by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). They find that the bank's impending insolvency and the subsequent FDIC rescue had negative and positive effects on client firm share prices, respectively. These results imply that an unanticipated reduction in bank durability imposes significant costs on borrowers. On a macro-economy level, Bernanke (1983) examines the effects of the U.S. financial crisis during the period of the Great Depression on the real costs of credit intermediation. He shows that the failures of banks and other lenders reduce the efficiency of the financial sector in performing its intermediary functions and adversely affect the real economy. He argues that the difficulties of the banks during the Great Depreciation increased the costs of intermediation, making credit by the bank expensive and difficult to obtain. He also shows that bank failures are not caused by anticipations of future changes in aggregate output and refutes the opposite direction of causality.
In this paper, we provide direct evidence on the value of durable main bank relationships, using a large sample of exogenous events that negatively affected bank credit ability. Our evidence is from Korea during 1997-1998, a period during which banks experienced substantial difficulties that forced them to contract credit. Our objective is to provide some systematic evidence on the extent to which firm value is related to the degree of financial health of both the main bank and the client firm.
For a sample of 113 bank-specific events that affected Korean banks adversely during the 1997-1998 period, we find that the bank and a portfolio of client firms experience average three-day announcement returns of -2.49 percent and -1.26 percent, respectively, both of which are significant at the 0.01 level.
The results from our cross-sectional analysis show that client firms of banks with high nonperforming loan ratios and/or poor stock market performance suffer a greater loss in their share values, and that client firms perform worse on days when their bank's stock price performance deteriorates.
We also find that the costs of bank distress are higher for bank-dependent firms and financially weak firms. Firms that borrow more from the banks and that are highly levered experience a larger drop in the value of their equity. In contrast, firms with alternative means of external financing and firms with more liquid assets experience a small drop in share value.
However, the analysis for subperiods indicates that the results are mainly driven by the banking crisis period, during which banks were saddled with huge amounts of bad loans that forced them to pull back sharply on lending. This result is consistent with that of Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) and suggests that bank difficulties impose costs on borrowers and that the financial health of banks is an important factor for the continuity of the bank-firm relationship.
Overall, our findings provide strong support for the argument that a bank-centered financial system imposes costs on borrowers when their bank is in financial distress, and that bank distress is more costly for financially constrained firms and/or firms that are in weak financial health. They also suggest that the combination of bank and firm conditions determines the impact of bad news about a bank on its customers.
Our paper is related to two recent studies on the costs of the bank-centered financial system in Japan. Gibson (1995) uses a sample of 1,355 Japanese firms from 1991 to 1992 to examine whether the health of the main bank influences the investment of client firms. He shows that a firm with a low-rated main bank (AA-) invests 30 percent less than a firm with a high-rated main bank (AA+). However, his results indicate that two banks rated AA-have significant effects on the investment of firms with equal magnitude but opposite signs, which suggests that the investment effect he documents does not seem to be tightly associated with the financial health of the main bank. Kang and Stulz (2000) examine the costs of a bank-centered financial system using a sample of 1,380
Japanese firms for the period of 1986 to 1993. Unlike Gibson (1995) , Kang and Stulz (2000) take the view that the whole banking sector in Japan was experiencing difficulties during the 1990-1993 period, so that high bank dependence is costly for a firm irrespective of its main bank identity. They show that firms that borrowed more from banks suffered larger drops in stock prices and cut investments back more substantially during the 1990-1993 period.
In this paper, we extend this literature by providing evidence for an explicit link between the financial health of banks and firm value. Unlike Gibson (1995) , we focus on the effect of bank difficulties on the market value of client firms, not on their investment behavior. Our approach is also different from that of Kang and Stulz (2000) in that the focus of the present work is to examine the explicit link between the financial heath of the main banks and their client firms. We extensively utilize variables that capture the financial health of each main bank and each client firm, and examine the importance of the financial health of both main bank and client firm in relationship banking.
In addition, while both of the above papers use data from Japan to examine the importance of bankfirm ties, our paper uses data from Korea where banks have also played a key role in corporate financing.
Therefore, the results in this paper can provide complementary evidence on the costs of a bank-centered financial system and help us better understand the value of durable bank relationships.
Finally, unlike the Gibson (1995) and Kang and Stulz (2000) studies, which are perhaps subject to the potential causality problem, our paper adopts the event-study approach. If firms are in severe financial distress, this adversely affects the banks since borrowers become less credit-worthy and bank loans lose value. In other words, poor firm performance affects main bank performance and the causality could run from the firm to the bank, which makes the results for bank-firm relationships difficult to interpret. To avoid this problem and to investigate bank-firm relationships in an unambiguous way, we focus on the exogenous shocks that affect Korean banks adversely and their effects on the market value of both banks and firms. In this respect, our approach is similar to Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) . 1 However, their experiment focuses on only one bank in near bankruptcy, while our paper uses a dataset of various main banks and client firms that differ in their financial characteristics. This dataset allows us to explore the cross-sectional variation of the valuation effect of bank-firm relationships in a more informative way.
Our paper is also related to several recent studies that examine the value of durable bank relationships. Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (2000) measure the impact of bank distress announcements on the stock prices of firms maintaining a relationship with a distressed bank, using the near-collapse of the Norwegian banking system during the 1988-1991 period. Unlike the results of this study, they find 1 James (1987) , Lummer and McConnell (1989), and Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) also use the eventstudy approach, but their focuses are on the positive side of bank loans in bank-firm relationships. They find that the announcements of new bank loans and loan renewal agreements have a positive effect on firm value. that the aggregate impact of bank distress on listed firms is small and statistically insignificant. They attribute this finding to the ease of alternative financing from equity markets when banks are in distress. Djankov, Jindra, and Klapper (2000) examine the valuation effect of a bank's insolvency on client firms, using a sample of 31 insolvent banks in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand during the period 1998-1999.
They find that for the entire sample the announcement of a bank's insolvency such as a bank closure leads to negative abnormal performance of related firms, while the announcement of a nationalization is associated with positive abnormal performance. Their findings suggest that the continuity of the banking relationship adds value to a firm. However, their regression results using all firms do not seem to be entirely consistent with those using a subsample of firms in each country. For instance, they find that announcements of a bank closure are significantly negatively related to the abnormal returns for client firms in Indonesia, but such announcements are insignificantly positively related to client firms in Thailand. They also find that announcements of a nationalization lead to significantly positive returns for client firms in Korea, but such announcements do not have any discernable effects on returns for client firms in Indonesia and Thailand. Finally, Karceski, Ongena, and Smith (2000) analyze the share price responses of Norwegian borrowers to bank merger announcements during the period 1983-1996 by separating borrowers according to whether they are affiliated with the acquiring, target, or rival banks.
They find that small borrowers of target banks lose about three percent in equity value when their bank is announced as a merger target and these borrowers are pushed out of the banking relationships after a bank merger.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief discussion of some important characteristics of bank financing in Korea. Section 3 describes our sample selection process and the data. Section 4 provides the estimates of abnormal announcement returns for main banks and portfolios of client firms and reports results from cross-sectional regressions. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
Characteristics of bank financing in Korea
There are important characteristics of bank financing in Korea that make the country particularly well suited to our investigation, the first being that the Korean market is predominantly bank-centered.
Although the importance of bank financing in Korea has recently decreased due to financial deregulation and capital market liberalization, Korean firms still rely strongly on bank financing and maintain close financial ties with their main banks. the average annual net increases in loans, stocks, and bonds were 40 trillion won, 8 trillion won, and 16 trillion won, respectively. In contrast, the figures for 1998 are strikingly different. The net increases in 1998 were -37 trillion won, 10 trillion won, and 32 trillion won for loans, stocks and bonds, respectively. Figure 2 shows very clearly that during 1998, banks experienced a severe credit crunch and were forced 2 According to the Bank of Korea, loans include bank loans, loans from other financial institutions, and commercial paper. These loans account for 26.5, 27.0, and 8.9 percent of total corporate financing, respectively. The Bank of Korea classifies loans made from the trust account of deposit banks as loans from other financial institutions, which leads to an understatement in the proportion of loans from banks. Other financial institutions are classified into five categories according to their business activities: development, savings, investment, insurance, and other institutions.
to curtail lending to the corporate sector. Consequently, their borrowers had to turn to alternative sources of external finance, notably corporate bonds.
Finally, the data on bank-firm relationships are readily available for Korea. The data on the identity of main banks and their client firms are compiled by the Korean Listed Companies' Association and are publicly available.
Sample selection and data
Our sample consists of exogenous events that negatively affected Korean banks from January 1997 to December 1998. As of the end of 1997, there were 15 nationwide commercial banks and ten regional banks in Korea. After deleting those banks with no listed client firms (mostly regional banks) or with no events reported during our sample period, we are left with 15 banks in our sample.
Negative news announcements for the banks include bankruptcy of a client firm, credit downgrading of a bank, deterioration of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ratio, and other occurrences, such as failure of scheduled foreign borrowing or a claims suit.
We identify the initial public announcement date of the event from two daily newspapers, Daily Economics and Korean Economics, publications that are essentially the Korean equivalents of the Wall Street Journal. We use as the announcement date the date that a news announcement first appeared in either of these two publications. To avoid having results confounded by multiple events that clustered during a short time period, we eliminate those events that occur within five calendar days after the first event. Our restrictions result in a final sample of 113 events for the sample of 15 banks.
We obtain the list of client firms for each main bank from the Annual Statistics published by the Korean Listed Companies' Association. The Korean Listed Companies' Association compiles and publishes this list of the main banks of all listed companies in Korea annually. Although a firm can borrow from several banks, the Annual Statistics lists only one bank as the main bank that provides the major financing to the firm.
We search the Annual Statistics for 1996 and 1997 and match each listed firm with our sample banks.
Although bankruptcy of a client firm is an important type of negative news announcement for a bank and is used in the analysis of the announcement returns for the bank, we do not use bankrupt client firms per se when we examine the abnormal returns for client firms. We eliminate those bankrupt firms because our objective is to examine the effect of bank difficulties on client firm value. Given that the bankruptcy announcement of a client firm leads to a significant drop in the value of the firm's equity, the inclusion of the bankrupt firms in the sample would result in the contamination of the announcement returns for client firms by this bankruptcy effect. This selection criterion results in a final sample of 573 client firms.
We obtain the stock-price data from the daily return file of the Korea Investors Service-Stock Market Analysis Tool (KIS-SMAT), which includes all firms listed on both the First and the Second Sections of the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE). the amount expected to be collected by collateral liquidation from customers who have loans that are overdue at least three month; 2) doubtful loans -the portion of credit in excess of the partially recoverable loans that are expected to be a loss, but have not yet been realized as such; and 3) estimated losses -the portion of credit in excess of the partially recoverable loans that must be accounted as a loss, because collection is not possible in a forseeable period. Bad loans are computed by excluding the partially recoverable loans from nonperforming loans.
The ratio of bad loans to total loans tripled, going from 0.75 percent at the end of 1996 to 2.22 percent at the end of 1997. The largest increase in the bad loan ratio from 1996 to 1997 comes from Korea First Bank, followed by Seoul Bank. These two banks served as the main bank for several large corporations that went bankrupt after 1995. One of these bankruptcies was the Hanbo Group, the eleventh largest business group in Korea. The average ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans also significantly increased from 3.70 percent at the end of 1996 to 6.28 percent at the end of 1997. 3 One way to understand the magnitude of this deterioration in ratios is as follows. The average total loan outstanding for our sample banks was 19.85 trillion won in 1996 and 24.03 trillion won in 1997.
Multiplying the average nonperforming loan ratios by these values implies a nonperforming loan amount of 0.73 trillion won at the end of 1996 and 1.51 trillion won at the end of 1997. These numbers translate into 58.4 and 139.8 percent of the average net equity values of our sample banks in 1996 and 1997, respectively. In other words, as of the end of 1997, nonperforming loans for our sample banks averaged 1.4 times their net equity, which implies that the average banks are de facto insolvent if we assume that all nonperforming loans are written off. The last column of Panel C of Table 1 Although the whole of the banking sector in Korea experienced difficulties during the crisis period, it should be noted that there is a large cross-sectional variation in the nonperforming loan ratios for our sample banks. The average and median increase in the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans from 1996 to 1997 are 2.57 and 1.70 percentage points, respectively, with a standard deviation of 1.69. The highest change in the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans is also from the Korea First Bank, which experienced an increase of 4.70 percentage points. In contrast, the Commercial Bank realized the smallest increase of 0.48 percentage point.
To put things in perspective, consider one bank with an increase in the nonperforming loan ratio one standard deviation lower and another bank with one standard deviation higher than the average value. The increase in the nonperforming loan ratio is 0.88 of a percentage point for a bank at one standard deviation lower and as much as 4.26 percentage points for a bank at one standard deviation higher. The equivalent figures for the bad loan ratio are 0.19 and 2.75 percentage points, respectively.
In Table 2 , we present the summary statistics of a sample of 486 client firms for which we are able to find financial data from several sources. We obtain bank loan data from the firms' annual audit reports and other financial data from the Listed Company Database of Korean Listed Companies Association and the firms' annual reports. Our statistics are the average values of variables at the end of the fiscal years of 1996 and 1997. The table reports the descriptive statistics including the mean, the standard deviation, the median, and the first and the third quartile values.
The average and the median sizes of our sample firms measured by total assets are 688 billion won and 167 billion won. Assuming an exchange rate of 1,200 won to a dollar, these figures amount to US$57 million and US$14 million. Investment securities account for an average of 8.15 percent of total assets.
We define bank debt as the sum of bank loans and corporate bonds guaranteed by the bank. It is a common practice in Korea for main banks to guarantee the corporate bonds issued by their client firms, making corporate bonds de facto bank loans. During our sample period, among our 486 sample firms, only 145 firms issued bonds that were not guaranteed by the bank. The average bank debt represents 28.65 percent of total assets. Nonbank debt, as measured by total debt minus bank debt, accounts for 39.03 percent. The medians show a similar pattern. For the sample firms, the main bank borrowing averages 5.71 percent of total assets and ranges from zero to 59.81 percent.
In comparison, Kang and Stulz (2000) report that for a sample of Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as of fiscal year-end 1989, the mean and median bank loans to total assets ratios are 21 percent and 16 percent, respectively. For a sample of Japanese firms from 1977 to 1993, Kang, Shivdasani and Yamada (2000) show that the average fraction of a firm's total borrowings from its main bank to the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity is 3.6 percent, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 14.6 percent. These results suggest that Korean firms tend to borrow more from the banks than do their Japanese counterparts and that bank loans are an important source of financing in Korea.
As a measure of liquidity, we examine the ratio of cash flow to total assets and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. We compute cash flow as the sum of operating income and depreciation. Liquid assets are cash plus marketable securities. The means for these variables are 8.65 percent and 9.87 percent, respectively.
The last two rows of Table 2 present the summary statistics on the frequency of foreign bank borrowing by our sample firms and the number of banks from which they borrow. The foreign bank dummy takes the value of one if the firm borrows from a foreign bank and zero otherwise. We find that this variable has the mean of 0.24. That is, 116 firms borrow from foreign banks. Our sample firms on average borrow from six different banks, with a median of 5.5 banks, suggesting that many firms in our sample maintain multiple bank relationships.
Empirical results

Announcement returns for main banks and portfolios of client firms
In this section, we examine the abnormal returns for the main banks and their client firms around the time of the announcement of negative news impacting the main banks. We compute abnormal returns by using standard event-study methodology following Brown and Warner (1985) . We estimate market model parameters by using days-220 to -20 relative to the news announcement. The daily abnormal return is accumulated to obtain the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from days-t before the news announcement date to day+t after the announcement date. We use t-statistics to test the hypothesis that the average CARs are equal to zero and sign-rank test statistics to test the hypothesis that the CARs are distributed symmetrically around zero.
One concern in the estimation of the abnormal returns is the impact of overlapping estimation periods on the independence of the computed returns. Since we use the market-model approach to estimate abnormal returns for the events and the estimation periods (day-220 to day-20) of different events overlap in many cases, it is likely that t-statistics in the analyses of the abnormal returns are biased upwards. To see whether the overlapping estimation period affects the results of the paper in a significant way, we repeat all analyses below using the market-adjusted-return method and find results that are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. We also experiment with the constant-mean-return model for which the benchmark return is estimated by averaging the returns from day-30 to day-11 and find that our results do not change when we use this approach. Therefore, our results do not seem to be affected by overlapping estimation periods, although we cannot entirely rule out the possibility of such an effect in our abnormal returns. Table 3 presents the CARs (-1, 1) for main banks and for portfolios of client firms. In tests not reported here, we also experiment with the CARs (-1, 0) and CARs (-2, 2) and obtain results similar to those reported here.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the announcement returns for main banks. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics and those in brackets are median returns. The first number in braces is the number of events with positive CARs and the second number is the total number of events. The average and median CARs during the 1997-1998 period are -2.49 and -1.61 percent, respectively, both of which are significant at the 0.01 level. Only 39 out of 100 news events show positive CARs. 4 The breakdown of the sample by type of news announcements shows a similar pattern. The average and median CARs for the subsamples of bankruptcy and credit downgrade are all significantly negative at the 0.05 level.
Panel A of Table 3 also presents the CARs for Korean banks by the two subperiods, before and during the crisis. The banks realize significant mean and median CARs of -3.92 and -4.38 percent during the crisis period. In contrast, the mean (median) CAR before the crisis is -0.67 percent (0.29 percent) and is not significant. Furthermore, the number of positive CARs is much smaller during the crisis period than before. Only 17 out of 56 events show positive CARs during the crisis period, but 22 of 44 events show positive CARs before the crisis. Tests of differences in mean and median CARs across two subperiods reject the null hypothesis that they are equal. These results suggest that negative announcement returns for the full sample period are mostly attributable to the crisis period, when banks faced substantial problems limiting their ability to renew old loans and extend new loans to firms. Table 3 reports the effect of banking shocks on client-firm value. Since the events that affect client firms that belong to the same main bank are perfectly clustered in calendar time, we combine the client firms of each main bank into a single equally weighted portfolio and compute the announcement returns. In tests not reported here, we also experiment with the value-weighted portfolio returns and obtain the results that are qualitatively similar to those using the equally weighted portfolio returns.
Panel B of
During the full sample period, the average and median CARs (-1, 1) for the portfolio of client firms are -1.26 percent and -0.46 percent, respectively, both of which are significant at the 0.01 level. Out of 113 events, 66 (58 percent) show negative reactions. Consistent with the results for the banks, our subperiod analysis indicates that client firms realize negative returns only during the crisis period. The tests of differences in mean and median returns across two subperiods reject the null hypotheses of equal announcement returns.
The classification by type of news announcements indicates that client firms experience a mean CAR of -1.01 percent in the case of bankruptcy announcements and -1.74 percent in the case of credit downgrade announcements. These announcement returns are significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. The median returns, however, are significant only for the events of bankruptcy announcements.
The fact that the announcement returns for both main banks and portfolios of client firms are negative only during the crisis period suggests that the financial health of main banks is an important factor for the continuity of the bank-firm relationship. When banks are financially healthy, their ability to lend to the firms is less likely to be distorted by negative shocks, since they have enough capital to buffer themselves against those shocks. However, when the financial health of main banks is extremely poor, as it was during the crisis period, the banks become vulnerable to even small negative shocks. As the bank tightens credit to its client firms and the bank durability significantly deteriorates so that the termination of bankfirm relationships becomes a real possibility, client firms must turn to more expensive sources of external finance and firm value is thus adversely affected.
There is one issue to be addressed in interpreting our announcement returns for the portfolio of client firms. As noted in Footnote 4, the KDB and the Industrial Bank were not listed during our sample period and the Korean government wholly owns the KDB. This means that the KDB cannot really fail, but Panel B of Table 3 includes not only client firms that belong to the KDB but also client firms for which failure may actually be an issue. To see whether our results are significantly different between firms belonging to the KDB and those belonging to other banks, we examine the portfolio CARs (-1, 1) for these two types of firms separately. The results presented in Panel C of Table 3 show that the mean and median CARs (-1, 1) for the portfolio of client firms associated with the KDB are insignificantly negative and those for the portfolio of client firms associated with non-government-owned banks are significantly negative at the 0.01 levels. The evidence, therefore, indicates that our results in Panel B of Table 3 are not affected by including firms that have relationships with a government-owned bank. Nevertheless, we repeat all analyses below excluding firms affiliated with the KDB and find the qualitative results unchanged. 5
Announcement returns and the quality of main banks
The previous section investigated the hypothesis that under a bank-centered system, banking shocks cause the bank-firm relationship to be costly for borrowing firms and consequently a deterioration in bank durability has a negative effect on client-firm value. In this section, we further show that firm value is an increasing function of the degree of financial health of the main bank, and that client firms affiliated with poorly performing banks suffer more from banking shocks.
There are several ways to measure the financial health of a bank. One readily available measure is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. One advantage of using the nonperforming loan ratio is that there is a large cross-sectional variation of this ratio across the banks during our sample period, which suggests that this ratio may capture the variation of bank quality better than other measures. We also use the ratio of bad loans to total loans, rather than the nonperforming loan ratio, as a proxy for the financial health of banks. We find that the results are not affected. 6 Yet another way is to use a bank's credit rating as a measure of bank health. In fact, credit ratings are likely to be more informative than the accounting measures of bank health since, as Gibson (1995) points out, the accounting measures are backwardlooking, while credit ratings are forward-looking. However, it turns out that there is little variation in credit ratings among our sample banks, since the whole banking sector was experiencing difficulties during our sample period. 7 In tests not reported here, we find that credit ratings have little power to explain the cross-sectional variation in returns of the client firms.
Alternatively, the market-based measures of bank health may reflect bank quality more fully and more accurately than accounting measures of bank health. We measure the market-based measures of bank condition in two ways. First, we estimate the cumulative bank-industry adjusted excess return from day -110 to day -11 before the event date. Second, we compute the quasi-market value of the bank (debt plus market value of equity) over total assets to proxy for Tobin's q. In computing the market value of bank equity, we use the closing price of stock five days before the announcement date. Table 4 shows the extent to which the CARs for client firms differ depending on these measures of bank condition. We compare the CARs for client firms that are associated with bad-quality banks to those with good-quality banks. We partition our sample banks into "bad" and "good" by the medians of nonperforming loans to total loans (panel A), bank-industry adjusted cumulative excess returns (panel B), and Tobin's q (panel C). For the events before the crisis, we use the median ratios as of the end of 1996.
For the events during the crisis period, we use the median ratios as of the end of 1997.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the CARs for the portfolio of client firms before the crisis are small and are not significant when bank quality is measured by the nonperforming loan ratio. The CARs for the portfolio of client firms associated with good-quality banks during the crisis period are also not statistically significant. However, the CARs for the portfolio of client firms associated with bad-quality banks during the crisis period are significantly negative. The mean and median CARs are -2.43 and -1.25 percent, and they are significant at the 0.05 level. The t-test rejects the equality of the mean CARs between bad-quality banks before and during the crisis period. Panels B and C of Table 4 show remarkably similar results. The mean and median CARs are significantly negative only for banks with poor stock market performance and those with low Tobin's q during the crisis period, and they are significantly different from those for good-quality banks before the crisis. To further examine the importance of bank condition to abnormal returns for client firms, in unreported tests we also experiment with a more strict measure of bank health, dividing our sample into four groups according to two measures of bank health: low nonperforming loan/high Tobin's q, low nonperforming loan/low Tobin's q, high nonperforming loan/high Tobin's q, and high nonperforming loan/low Tobin's q. We find that only client firms associated with bad-quality (high nonperforming loans/low Tobin's q) banks suffer a significant loss. We obtain similar results when we replace Tobin's q with the industry-adjusted cumulative excess returns.
To clarify the relationship between main-bank health and its effect on the market value of client firms, we use multivariate regression analysis. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and White's (1980) adjustment for heteroskedasticity. The regression results are presented in Table 5 . In the first regression, we regress the CAR for the portfolio of client firms on the nonperforming loan ratio of the main bank, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the type of news event is the bankruptcy of the client firm, and a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the type of news event is the credit downgrade of the bank. The estimate on the coefficient of nonperforming loan ratio is significantly negative at the 0.10 level. 8 This result indicates that client firms of poor banks suffer a bigger loss in their share values than client firms of healthy banks do. There is no evidence that a particular type of news event has a bigger impact on client-firm value.
Although not reported here, we also estimate the regression by using the CAR for the main bank as the dependent variable, and the nonperforming loan ratio and dummy variables for the type of news events as independent variables. The coefficient estimate on the nonperforming loan ratio is -0.0054 with a t-statistic of -1.91. This result suggests that poor-quality banks suffer more from negative shocks. The dummy variables for the type of news events are not significant.
In the second regression, we drop the nonperforming loan ratio and replace it with the CAR for the main bank. The question we ask here is whether client-firm value is more negatively affected on days that the bank performs worse. If the magnitude of the stock-price effect for main banks reflects the degree of their financial heath to overcome exogenous shocks, we would expect a positive relation between the CAR for the portfolio of client firms and the CAR for the main bank. The CAR for the main bank has a coefficient of 0.1282 with a t-statistic of 1.82. Evaluating the estimated coefficient at the mean indicates that all else being constant, a 10 percent decrease in the CARs for the main bank results in about a 1.3 8 When we use the ratio of nonperforming loans to net equity in place of the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans, the coefficient estimate is -0.0080 with a t-statistic of -1.94. percent decrease in the CARs for the portfolios of client firms. Therefore, the effect of banking shocks on firm value seems to be both statistically and economically significant.
In the third regression, we include both the nonperforming loan ratio and the CAR for the main bank as explanatory variables. It turns out that only the CAR for the main bank is significantly positive. The coefficient on the nonperforming loan ratio has the predicted sign, but is not statistically significant. We attribute the insignificance of the coefficient on the nonperforming loan ratio to its negative correlation with the CAR for the main bank. The correlation between the two variables is -0.1943 with a p-value of 0.05. Alternatively, the CAR for the main bank might represent not only nonperforming loans that the bank accumulated in the past, but also the effect of a shock on the bank's future cash flows. Thus, the CAR may serve as a better proxy for bank health.
The next regression further confirms that the market-based measure of bank condition is more important than the accounting-based measure of bank condition in explaining the CAR for the portfolio of client firms. In the fourth regression, we add two additional variables that are expected to capture the market's assessment of the bank's relative performance: the industry-adjusted cumulative excess return and Tobin's q. The coefficients on these two variables are significantly positive, again indicating that client firms of well performing banks suffer less. Overall, the regression results support the notion that bank distress is costly to borrowers and borrowers suffer more when their banks are in a weak financial position.
The results of regressions (2) through (4), indicating that the CAR for the main bank is positively related to the CAR for its borrowing firms, raise the possibility that these results are caused by bank equity ownership held by client firms, not by the banking relationship. If client firms hold shares of their main bank and the stock price of the main bank drops due to banking shocks, we would expect a reduction of the stock price of client firms even though the bank-firm relationship has no value. In order to estimate this possibility, we collect data on main bank equity ownership held by each client firm at the end of the fiscal years of 1996 and 1997. We are able to obtain data on bank equity ownership for all firms in the sample. The mean (median) is 0.03 percent (0.00 percent) with the standard deviation of 0.22 percent. 9 A sample of 387 firms (79.6 percent) does not hold any equity of their main banks. We then reestimate regression (4) separately for the portfolio of client firms that do not hold equity of their main banks, regression (5), and for the portfolio of client firms that hold equity of their main banks, regression (6). An implication of the bank-ownership effect is that the positive relation between the CAR for the main bank and the CAR for client firms should be more pronounced for firms that hold equity of their main banks than for firms that hold no equity of their main banks. If the bank-firm relationship has no value and only the bank-ownership effect exists, we would also expect that the positive relation does not hold for firms with no main bank equity ownership. However, we find that the coefficients on the CAR for the main bank are significantly positive in both regressions, suggesting that the bank-firm relationship we document is not driven by the bank-ownership effect. Although the magnitude of the coefficient on the CAR for the main bank in regression (6) is larger than that in regression (5), they are not significantly different from one another (F = 0.13 with a p-value of 0.71). This finding further suggests that the positive coefficients on the CAR for the main bank are not due to ownership of bank equity held by client firms.
In Table 6 , we present the distribution of client firms according to industry and main banks. We also show the distribution of client firms by membership in the top 30 chaebols 10 and main banks. Our objective here is to show that the results of the CAR for the portfolio of client firms are not driven by either the industry effect or the chaebol effect. For example, if the main bank's borrowers are grouped in similar lines of business or if all firms within one chaebol borrow from the same bank, the returns for 9 The low holding of main bank equity ownership by client firms is largely attributable to a legal constraint that prevents industrial firms from owning more than 4 and 15 percent of the stocks of any single nationwide commercial bank and regional bank, respectively. 10 A chaebol is a business group in Korea in which member firms are bound together by a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, maintain substantial business ties with other firms in the group, and guarantee the debt of the other member firms by cross-debt guarantees.
client firms within a main bank tend to move together and thus may simply reflect common industries (chaebols) and not the banking relationship per se.
The results show that out of 486 client firms, 106 firms belong to the top 30 chaebols. We find that all but three firms that belong to the top 30 chaebols maintain a banking relationship with more than one bank and that they tend to be evenly distributed across different main banks. There are 14 different industries in the sample. The machinery and equipment industry has the largest number of client firms (129), followed by the chemical industry (91), while the electricity and gas industry has the smallest number of client firms (3). Table 6 clearly shows that the main bank maintains a relationship with various types of firms that operate in different lines of business. Further, while not reported for the sake of brevity, we are not able to find any evidence that a particular chaebol focuses on a certain industry.
Announcement returns and financial characteristics of client firms
We focus now on how the financial characteristics of client firms are related to their stock-return performance during announcement days. When main banks experience large shocks, their borrowers could use external capital markets, utilize internally generated cash flows, or curtail new investments for funding. For example, highly levered firms tend to have more difficulties obtaining external financing during a banking crisis. These firms would therefore suffer more during this period. In contrast, if borrowers have pre-established relationships with other banks or have other alternative sources of financing, they can turn to those sources for funding. Financially less constrained firms or firms with alternative sources of financing would therefore suffer less from bank distress. In this section, we explore the hypothesis that the financial health and constraints of client firms are important for overcoming banking shocks.
Fixed effects regression of CARs on firm characteristics
A straightforward approach to investigate the hypothesis that a more financially constrained firm suffers more from bank distress is to estimate cross-sectional regressions by regressing the announcement returns for the portfolio of client firms measured in Section 4.1 on explanatory variables that are proxies for the financial constraints of client firms.
One way to obtain the measure of the financial constraints of client firms within a portfolio is to use the average values of client firms such as the average of leverage ratios, the average of liquidity ratios, etc. However, this approach poses an immediate problem: The average value will be a mixture of firms with different financial characteristics. To the extent that client firms with various financial characteristics are evenly distributed within each main bank, the average firm characteristics of client firms within a portfolio will converge to the mean value and will hence show little variation across different main banks.
This in turn will give us little statistical power to determine the relation between firm characteristics and announcement returns.
To avoid this problem, we use a fixed effects regression. For a sample of 486 client firms for which financial data are available, we compute the cumulat ive abnormal returns from day -1 to day +1 for each news event and for each client firm. We use the CAR (-1, 1) as the dependent variable and the variables in Table 2 as independent variables. For the analysis of the full sample period, we calculate independent variables as the average values of variables at the end of the fiscal years of 1996 and 1997. For the analysis of the period before (during) the crisis, we use the values at the end of the fiscal year of 1996 (1997).
We also include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm belongs to one of the top 30 chaebols and 13 industry dummy variables to control for a possible industry effect in all regressions. The results are similar if industry effects are not controlled. Finally, we add a dummy variable for each event, so that any common movement in a bank's borrowers' CARs would be captured by the fixed effect. We would then have a testable hypothesis that common movements across firms on the same announcement day are statistically significant, by testing the joint hypothesis that all event dummies have zero coefficients. 11
Panel A of Table 7 shows the results for the full sample period. To conserve space, the table does not report coefficients on the industry dummies and the event dummies. In the first regression, we include firm size, a top-30 chaebol dummy, the ratio of investment securities to total assets, main bank shareholdings by client firm, and the leverage ratio. Since highly levered firms would have more difficulty obtaining external financing during a banking crisis, we expect such firms to experience a larger drop in the value of their equity. We would expect larger firms to be more established and that they might suffer less from adverse shocks. Therefore, we expect the coefficient of firm size to be positive. Finally, we expect investment securities to affect equity returns adversely, since the value of investment securities dropped significantly during our sample period.
Most of explanatory variables have the expected signs, although not all of them are significant. Firm size and the membership in a chaebol seem to have little effect on announcement returns for client firms, although they have the expected sign. The coefficients on the ratio of investment securities to total assets and the main bank holdings are not significant. The only significant variable in the regression is the leverage ratio. The coefficient has the estimate of -0.0375 and is significant at the 0.01 level, which indicates that firms that carry a larger debt realize more negative announcement returns.
To investigate the impact of debt composition on announcement returns, we show a second regression in which we partition total debt into bank debt and nonbank debt. We expect that the leverage effect is more pronounced if the firm has a higher fraction of bank debt in its capital structure. This is because, in a bank-centered financial system, firms that are more bank dependent usually have not developed alternative financing channels and thus will have more difficulty obtaining external funds during a crisis period. We also add the ratios of cash flow to total assets and liquid assets to total assets. We expect less 11 We thank the referee for suggesting this approach. of a drop for firms with more cash flow and more liquid assets, since these firms are likely to have less demand for external financing. The regression result shows that both the bank debt and nonbank debt ratios are significantly negative. However, both the magnitude of the estimate and the significance level are larger for bank debt than for nonbank debt, indicating that bank debt is a more important variable than nonbank debt in explaining the announcement returns for client firms. Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficients on the ratio of cash flow to total assets and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets are significantly positive with t-statistics of 3.71 and 4.51, respectively.
In the third regression, we further investigate the results on the bank loan ratio by including the fraction of the debt from the firm's main bank to total assets. We find that CARs are negatively and significantly related to a firm's borrowings from its main bank, but that the coefficient on the nonbank debt ratio is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The negative relation between the CAR and the main bank loan ratio is consistent with the view that a firm's bank dependence negatively affects its performance when the main bank experiences difficulties. The coefficient on the main bank loan ratio is statistically different from the coefficient on the nonbank debt ratio (F=2.87 with a p-value of 0.09).
To examine more closely the effect of a firm's financial ability to overcome banking shocks on firm performance, in the fourth regression we include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm's debt includes public bonds that are not guaranteed by the bank. We also add three additional variables to capture further the possible substitution effect of main bank financing: a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has borrowed from a foreign bank, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has its stock listed on a foreign stock exchange, 12 and the number of banks from which the firm borrows. We expect less of a drop in the value of equity for firms that are able to issue public bonds for which the bank does not guarantee the payment, since these firms tend to have better access to capital 12 Among our sample, only 14 firms have their stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange or the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. markets. Along the same line, we expect less of a drop for firms that are able to borrow from foreign banks, have their stock listed on a foreign stock exchange, or have multiple bank relationships. This is because these firms are more likely to have access to alternative sources of bank financing when their main banks are in financial distress. It turns out that the dummy variable for public bond issue is significantly positive at the 0.01 level. This result suggests that firms that can finance through other sources and need not rely on banks experience lower losses in the market value of their equity during the period of banking shocks. The other three variables that are expected to capture the substitution effect are not significant. 13 While not reported, we find that the joint hypothesis that the coefficient estimates on all event dummies are zero is strongly rejected at the 0.001 level.
In Panel B of Table 7 , we report the regression estimates for subperiods. In both subperiods, the ratio of cash flow to total assets and the dummy variable for public bond are significantly positive, and the ratio of main bank debt to total assets is significantly negative. However, the adjusted R-squares of the regressions in the period during the banking shocks are about three times larger than those in period before the banking shocks (25 vs. 9 percent). These results suggest that the regression model in the second subperiod fits the data better than that in the first subperiod. To the extent that main bank debt captures the extent of bank dependence, our finding that the main bank debt ratio is negative in both periods implies that firms that are more bank dependent realize worse negative announcement returns even during the period before the banking crisis. The ratio of liquid assets to total assets is significantly positive only in the second subperiod.
Overall, the regression analysis in Table 7 indicates that firms that depend more on bank financing experience a larger drop in the value of their equity when their main banks experience difficulties. In contrast, firms with alternative means of financing and firms with more liquidity experience a lower drop. 13 In a regression not reported here, we replace the number of banks from which a firm borrows with a dummy variable for a multiple bank relationship. The coefficient on this dummy variable is again not significant.
These results are consistent with the view that bank relationships are less valuable when banks perform poorly, and that financially constrained client firms are more sensitive to adverse shocks to banks.
An alternative specification
One limitation with the fixed effects regression is that it does not allow us to examine how the financial health of the bank and the combination of bank and firm conditions will determine the impact of bad news about a bank on its customers. This is because the event dummies used in the fixed effects regression are perfectly correlated with the variable for bank health, such as the nonperforming loan ratio of the main bank. To gain further insight into this issue, we compute the average announcement returns for each client firm across different events and relate these returns to the main bank health and the financial characteristics of each client firm. We compute the average announcement returns for each client firm across news events as follows. First, we select the sample of 486 client firms for which financial data are available. For each negative news event and for each client firm, we compute the cumulative abnormal returns from day -1 to day +1, using a market model. Then we average the cumulative abnormal returns for the client firm across news events.
For example, the Korea Exchange Bank has 54 client firms for which financial data are available.
There are seven news events during the sample period, resulting in seven cumulative abnormal returns for each of the 54 client firms. We average the cumulative abnormal returns across the seven news events for each client firm, resulting in 54 average cumulative abnormal returns. We call this average announcement return for the client firm across news events the "ARC". We apply the same procedures to client firms of other main banks, resulting in 486 ARCs. We then examine the relation between the ARCs and main bank and firm characteristics using OLS regression.
While not reported, we find that the results of the ARCs are similar to those of the CARs in Panel B of Table 3 . The average ARC for the sample of 486 client firms during the full sample period is -1.04 percent and is significant at the 0.01 level. The median ARC is -0.81 percent and is also significant at the 0.01 level. The results also show that the average ARC before the crisis is not statistically different from zero, but it is significantly negative during the crisis period. The mean and median differences in ARCs before and during the crisis period are statistically significant, rejecting our null hypothesis of equal returns across the two subperiods. Breaking down the ARCs by type of news event indicates that the most negative ARC is in the subsample of credit downgrades during the crisis period. Overall, the results indicate that our new metric preserves the general messages delivered by the previous results using portfolio returns. 14 For the cross-sectional analysis, we use the ARC (-1, 1) as the dependent variable and use variables from Table 7 and the nonperforming loan ratio as independent variables. Panel A of Table 8 presents the results for the full sample period. We find that the results of regressions (1) through (4) are similar to those in the fixed effects regression model: The firms that have larger debt, that have low cash flow, and that have low liquidity realize a larger drop in the value of their equity. We also find that the coefficients on the nonperforming loan ratio are negative and significant at the 0.10 level, which indicates that client firms of financially weak banks realize a bigger loss.
To examine the interaction effect between bank and borrower conditions, we add two additional variables in the fifth regression: 1) an interaction between a dummy variable for bad-quality banks and a dummy variable for highly leveraged firms and 2) an interaction between a dummy variable for badquality banks and a dummy variable for low cash flow/low liquidity firms. A dummy variable for bad quality banks takes the value of one if both the nonperforming loan ratio for the bank is above the sample 14 A potential problem with the ARCs is that the assumption of the cross-sectional independence in the OLS regression to estimate the market model may not be justified, since the events we consider are perfectly clustered among client firms of the same main bank. However, to the extent that the main banks maintain lending relationships with many firms in various industries as shown in Table 6 , inferences based on residuals from the market model would probably not be affected by this concern. Further, given that this bias applies to periods both before and during the crisis, it is less likely that any results favoring our hypothesis are due to the problem of crosssectional dependence. median and the Tobin's q for the bank is below the sample median. A dummy variable for high leverage firms takes the value of one if the ratio of total debt to total assets for the client firm is above the sample median. A dummy variable for low cash flow/low liquidity firms takes the value of one if both the ratio of cash flow to total assets and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets for the client firm are below the sample medians. The coefficients on the interaction variables thus measure the marginal impact of a client firm with high total debt or with low cash flow/low liquidity when it borrows from the bad bank.
The results show that the coefficient on the first interaction variable is negative and significant at the 0.10 level. This result suggests that the combination of bank and firm conditions is important in determining the value of durable bank relationships. The coefficient on the second interaction variable, however, is not significant.
In Panel B of Table 8 , we report the regression estimates for subperiods. The results indicate that our findings for the full sample period are the mirror image of those for the period during the banking shocks.
In contrast, most of the variables in the period before the banking shocks are insignificant except for the main bank debt ratio.
Summary and conclusion
In this paper, using a large sample of exogenous events that negatively affect Korean banks, we examine the value of durable bank relationships. We show systematic evidence on the extent to which firm value is related to the degree of financial health of the main bank during a period of banking shocks.
We also show that the costs of bank distress are higher for financially constrained and unhealthy firms. Firms that are tied to banks with larger bad loans and firms that have few alternative means of external financing suffer more from the adverse shocks to banks. Firms with high leverage (bank loans) and less liquidity experience a larger drop in the value of their equity.
Overall, the results in this paper indicate that the financial health of both banks and client firms matters in maintaining the benefits of relationship banking during a banking crisis period.
Our results suggest that there are benefits to a firm from diversifying its financing sources or from cultivating alternative financing channels. Since the capital market is relatively undeveloped in those countries that adopt a bank-centered financial system, our results also suggest that these nations would benefit from diversifying their financial system. In a well-diversified financial system, firms can easily access other means of financing offered by capital markets, and this can provide firms with an alternative way to overcome the adverse effect of banking shocks. Table 1 Frequency distribution of negative news events experienced by Korean banks.
The sample includes negative news announcements associated with Korean banks from January 1997 to December 1998. Negative news announcements concern bankruptcy of a client firm, downgrading of the main bank's credit rating, decreases in BIS capital ratio, and "other", including the failure of scheduled foreign borrowing and claims suit. The initial public announcement dates of the negative news are obtained from two daily newspapers, Daily Economics and Korean Economics, which are the Korean equivalents to the Wall Street Journal. The date that a news announcement first appears in any one of these two publications is used as the announcement date. To avoid having results confounded by multiple events that clustered during a short time period, those events that occur within five calendar days after the first event are eliminated. These restrictions result in a final sample of 113 events for the sample of 15 banks. The identity of client firms for each main bank is obtained from the Annual Statistics published by the Korean Listed Companies' Association. The client firms are restricted to those listed on the Korean Stock Exchange during the sample period. Bankrupt client firms are excluded from the sample of client firms. Bad and nonperforming loan ratios are obtained from the Monthly Financial Statistics Bulletin published by the Financial Supervisory Service. Nonperforming loans include 1) substandard (partially recoverable) loans -the amount expected to be collected by collateral liquidation from customers who have loans that are overdue at least three months, 2) doubtful loans -the portion of credit in excess of the partially recoverable loans that are expected to be a loss, but have not yet been realized as such, and 3) estimated losses -the portion of credit in excess of the partially recoverable loans that must be accounted as a loss, because collection is not possible in a forseeable period. Bad loans are computed by excluding the partially recoverable loans from nonperforming loans. Table 2 Summary statistics of client firms of main banks.
Panel A: Distribution of events by main banks and by type of event
The sample includes 486 Korean client firms whose main banks experienced negative shocks from January 1997 to December 1998 and for which financial data are available from several sources. Bank loan data are obtained from a firm's annual audit report and other financial data are from the Listed Company Database of the Korean Listed Companies Association. The summary statistics are the average values of variables at the end of the fiscal years of 1996 and 1997. Bank debt is the sum of bank loans and corporate bonds guaranteed by the bank. Main bank debt is the sum of loans from the main bank and corporate bonds guaranteed by the main bank. Nonbank debt is total debt minus bank debt. The no guaranteed bond issue dummy takes the value of one if a firm's debt includes public bonds that are not guaranteed by the bank. Cash flow is computed as the sum of operating income and depreciation. Liquid assets are cash plus marketable securities. The foreign bank dummy takes the value of one if the firm borrows from foreign banks. Table 3 Three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the main bank and the portfolio of client firms around the announcement of negative news to the main bank.
Mean
The sample includes negative news announcements associated with Korean banks from January 1997 to December 1998. The CARs for the main bank from day -1 to day +1 are computed as the difference between realized returns and estimated returns, using the market model over the pre-event period of day -220 to day -21. To obtain the CARs for the portfolio of client firms, client firms of each bank are combined into a single equally weighted portfolio and the announcement returns corresponding to each event are computed. A sample of 113 events is used for client firms. A sample of 100 events is used for main banks, since the Korea Development Bank (KDB) and the Industrial Bank were not listed on the Korean Stock Exchange during the sample period. t-statistics appear in parentheses and median returns in brackets. The first number in braces is the number of events with positive CARs and the second number is the total number of events. Figures in parentheses of the last column are t-statistics for the test of equality of means and those in brackets are p-values of the Wilcoxon Z-test for equality of medians. ***, ** and * denote the significance of the parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.5 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Table 4 Three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the portfolio of client firms classified by subperiod and measures of main bank quality.
The sample includes Korean client firms whose main banks experienced negative shocks from January 1997 to December 1998. The client firms of each main bank are combined into a single equally weighted portfolio and the announcement returns corresponding to each event are computed. The abnormal returns are computed as the difference between realized returns and estimated returns, using the market model over the pre-event period of day -220 to day -21. For the events before the crisis period, the median ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (industry-adjusted cumulative excess returns from day -110 to day -11 and Tobin's q) as of the end of 1996 is used to split the total sample into the "bad" banks and the "good" banks. For the events during the crisis period, the median ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (industry-adjusted cumulative excess returns from day -110 to day -11 and Tobin's q) as of the end of 1997 is used. Tobin's q is measured by the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to total assets where the market value of equity is measured five days before the event dates. Figures in parentheses ( Table 5 OLS regression of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the portfolio of client firms on measures of main bank quality.
The sample includes Korean client firms whose banks experienced negative shocks from January 1997 to December 1998. For the portfolio of client firms, the dependent variable is the CARs from day -1 to day +1. The client firms of each main bank are combined into a single equally weighted portfolio and the announcement returns corresponding to each event are computed. The abnormal returns are computed as the difference between realized returns and estimated returns, using the market model over the pre-event period of day -220 to day -21. Nonperforming loans include 1) substandard (partially recoverable) loans -the amount expected to be collected by collateral liquidation from customers who have loans that are overdue at least three months, 2) doubtful loans -the portion of credit in excess of the partially recoverable loans that are expected to be a loss, but have not yet been realized as such, and 3) estimated losses -the portion of credit in excess of the partially recoverable loans that must be accounted as a loss, because collection is not possible in a forseeable period. Tobin's q is measured by the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to total assets where the market value of equity is measured five days before the event dates. White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote the significance of the parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.5 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Table 6 Distribution of client firms by chaebol affiliation and main-bank affiliation, and industry and main-bank affiliation.
The sample includes 486 Korean client firms whose main banks experienced negative shocks from January 1997 to December 1998 and for which financial data are available from several sources. A chaebol is a business group in Korea in which member firms are bound together by a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, maintain substantial business ties with other firms in the group, and guarantee the debt of the other member firms by cross-debt guarantees. 11  3  2  5  4  2  2  1  30  Textiles  13  10  11  9  3  3  3  1  4  57  Wood & paper products  3  4  3  4  5  1  2  1  1  4  28  Chemical  20  15  10  18  10  2  3  5  3  1  4  91  Non-metallic mineral  2  2  2  4  1  2  2  1  2  1  19  Basic metal  5  7  1  3  7  1  5  1  2  1  34  Machinery & equipment  15  16  16  11  11  4  6  2  20  6  5  1  2  15  129  Other manufacture  1  2  1  1  5  Construction  10  3  5  7  3  2  1  6  37  Wholesale & retail  3  6  5  7  2  1  3  1  1  29  Transport & storage  1  3  1  5  2  2  1  15  Electricity & gas  1  1  1  3  Hotels & restaurants  2  2  1  5   Total  86  72  58  76  47  12  17  3  54  9  12  3  8  29  486 Table 7 Fixed effect regression of the three-day cumulative announcement returns (CARs) on firm characteristics. Table 8 OLS regression of the three-day average announcement returns for client firms across news events (ARCs) on nonperforming loan ratio of the main bank and firm characteristics.
The sample includes Korean client firms whose main banks experienced negative shocks from January 1997 to December 1998. Only client firms for which financial data are available are used, resulting in 486 sample firms. The dependent variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal return for the client firm across news events (ARC) Nonperforming loans include 1) substandard (partially recoverable) loans -the amount expected to be collected by collateral liquidation from customers who have loans that are overdue at least three month, 2) doubtful loans -the portion of credit in excess of the partially recoverable loans that are expected to be a loss, but have not yet been realized as such, and 3) estimated losses -the portion of credit in excess of the partially recoverable loans that must be accounted as a loss, because collection is not possible in a forseeable period. Bank debt is the sum of bank loans and corporate bonds guaranteed by the bank. Main bank debt is the sum of loans from the main bank and corporate bonds guaranteed by the main bank. Nonbank debt is total debt minus bank debt. Cash flow is computed as the sum of operating income and depreciation. Liquid assets are cash plus marketable securities. The no guaranteed bond issue dummy takes the value of one if a firm's debt includes public bonds that are not guaranteed by the bank. The foreign bank dummy takes the value of one if the firm borrows from foreign banks. The depositary receipt dummy takes the value of one if the firm's stock is listed abroad. The bad-quality bank dummy takes the value of one if the nonperforming loan ratio for the bank is above the sample median and the Tobin's q is below the sample median. The highly leveraged firm dummy takes the value of one if the ratio of total debt to total assets for the client firm is above the sample median. Low cash flow / low liquidity firm dummy takes the value of one if both the ratio of cash flow to total assets and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets for the client firm are below the sample medians. All regressions include 13 industry dummy variables to control for industry effects. White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote the significance of the parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.5 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Korea during 1990 Korea during -1998 
